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We study the expressive power of various versions of Dynamic Logic and compare them 
with each other as well as with standard languages in the logical literature. One version of 
Dynamic Logic is equivalent to the infinitary logic Lz:,,,, but regular Dynamic Logic is 
strictly less expressive. In particular, the ordinals ww and 0”.2 are indistinguishable by 
formulas of regular Dynamic Logic. We also study the effects of including array assignments 
and/or random assignments on the expressive power of Dynamic Logic. 
0. INTRODUCTION 
Dynamic Logic (DL), a language for expressing properties of programs, was 
introduced by Pratt in [ 141 and studied in [6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 121. Actually, DL is a 
family of languages; the class of programs admitted in formulas is the most 
important parameter determining a particular version of the language. These various 
versions do not all have the same expressive power. In this paper we continue the 
comparative study of several versions of DL and intinitary logic outlined in [ 1 l] and 
begun in [lo, 121. 
DL resembles the predicate calculus in that its nonlogical symbols are uninter- 
preted. Thus its formulas do not have a full meaning until the interpretations of these 
symbols together with the range of the universe of discourse, are specified. Such an 
interpretation is called a state, or what amounts to essentially the same thing, a first 
order structure together with an assignment of values to the variables. Similarly, the 
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program expressions of DL are program schemes and do not determine computations 
until the state is given. Once the state is given, the formulas acquire truth values and 
the program schemes can be executed. 
In particular, Dynamic Logic extends the predicate calculus by allowing the 
formula construct (a&4, where a is a program and A is a formula. Let s k A mean 
that the state s satisfies the formula A. Then s + (a)A iff there is a computation of 
(the possibly nondeterministic) program a which begins at the state s and terminates 
at another state t such that t l=A. More precise definitions appear in the next section. 
One can think of a program scheme as an experiment on a state, exploring and 
modifying the state and thereby discovering its properties. We naturally expect that a 
language with more powerful program schemes can find out more about states than 
one with simpler program schemes, i.e., we expect it to be more expressive. 
We shall show that the expressive power of a version of DL depends importantly 
on the class of its program schemes. Consequently we can expect that there will be a 
correlation between the expressive power of the language and the ease or difficulty of 
proving facts about the particular class of programs. Moreover, by measuring the 
expressive power of these versions of DL we can hope to gain some insight into the 
properties of the classes of programs included in these languages. (See [ 111 for a 
discussion of this issue and a comparison of DL with other program logics.) 
DEFINITION 1. Let L be an uninterpreted language (say some version of DL) and 
P be a property of states, i.e., for every state s, either s has P or lacks P. We shall say 
that the property P is expressible in L if there is formula A of L such that for all 
states s, s has P iff s t= A. 
Our basic question is: what properties of states are expressible in various versions 
of DL? A related question concerns a comparison of expressive power among various 
versions of DL, as well as with standard languages in the literature. 
DEFINITION 2. Let L and M be two sets of logical formqulas. L is no more 
expressive than M (L <M) if for every formula A in L, there is an equivalent 
formula B in M, i.e., for every state s, s +A iff s k B. Similarly we say that L is 
strictly less expressive than M (L -KM) iff L <M and not M< L. Finally, L and M 
are equally expressive (L = M) iff L < M and M < L. 
The various versions of DL arise because of choices in the class of programs 
admitted. These choices can be made at two different points. 
(1) The class of basic instructions allowed. 
We may or may not allow random assignments of the form x := ? which nondeter- 
ministically change the value of x, but leave the state otherwise unchanged. Note that 
by use of the word random we are not suggesting any connection with probability. 
Also, we may or may not allow array assignmentsf(x) := T which change the values 
of some given function symbol f in the language. However, we always allow ordinary 
assignments of the form x := t where t is any term in the language. There is also 
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some choice as to the class of tests allowed. We may allow tests of the form A? for 
(a) atomic formulas A or (b) arbitrary program free formulas A or, most generously 
(c) arbitrary A in the language. This last version will be called “rich-test,” see [6]. 
The most common model of programs disallows random assignments and tests 
other than Boolean combinations of atomic tests. We emphasize here that by 
allowing these very general instructions, we are not suggesting that they should form 
a part of a serious model of effective processes on abstract structures. However, these 
more general programs serve a useful role in emphasizing the generality of some of 
our results. For example, the completeness results of [a], expressiveness results of 
[ 10, 121, and degree of undecidability results of [7], actually apply to the most 
general versions of DL. Allowing rich-tests also serves to clarify the relation betwen 
Dynamic Logic and classical inlinitary logic (cf. Section 2). 
(2) The kind of program constructions allowed. 
The strictest class of programs will be the class of regular programs, i.e., programs 
defined by finite nondeterministic flow charts. There is an alternative way to describe 
this class. Let a seq be a finite sequence of assignments (including array assignments 
and random assignments if these are allowed) and tests. Then a particular program 
execution consists of the execution of some seq. If we think of a program scheme 
as the set of all possible seqs which might get performed during any execution, i.e., all 
the seqs which are provided for in the program, then a regular program is one for 
which the corresponding set of seqs is regular. 
Programs with recursive calls (without parameters) are the same as context free 
programs, i.e., the set of seqs is context free. Finally, the most general class of 
programs we shall consider here is the class of recursively enumerable programs, 
where any r.e. set of seqs is allowed. We note the important fact that in an r.e. 
program an infinite (r.e.) set of distinct tests can occur, whereas in regular or context 
free programs, the set of distinct tests is finite, though of course each test may occur 
in infinitely many seqs. Finite test DL (denoted DL, from now on) will be DL with 
the sole restriction that only finitely many distinct tests have occurrences in (the seqs 
of) any one program scheme. Finite test DL includes both regular DL and context 
free DL as sublanguages. Moreover, every formula of atomic-test r.e. DL is 
equivalent to some formula of DL,. Since most programs considered in the literature 
use atomic tests, results about limitations of tinite test DL have wide application. 
Note that we shall always consider rich-test versions of DL except as explicitly noted. 
Connections between logics of programs and the well-known infinitary language 
L w,,. were first observed by Engeler [5], see also [l, 61. Lul,, is an infinitary 
language which is like the predicate calculus but allows, in addition to the usual first 
order syntactic constructs, countable disjunctions of formulas (cf. Definition 4 
below). We shall consider two sublanguages of L,,,,. Lz,u is a sublanguage of 
L WI,W, where the countable disjunctions are restricted to be recursively enumerable. 
(CK stands for “Church-Kleene,” since the syntax of Lz:,, is closely connected with 
the set of recursive ordinals, first studied extensively by Church and Kleene.) 
The other sublanguage, bounded alternation Lzr,w, denoted Lba, is actually a 
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sublanguage of Lzf,,, obtained essentially by restricting formula formation so that 
there is a fixed finite bound on the number of alternations of existential and universal 
quantifiers (cf. Definition 5 below). We show the following results connecting these 
languages with various versions of DL. 
(1) Rich-test r.e. DL (from now on denoted DL,,) with/without random and/or 
array assignments is equal in expressive power to Lzr,,. (Theorem 1, Section 2). 
(2) Both regular and context free (rich-test) DL are strictly weaker in expressive 
power than Lz:,,. (Theorem 3, Section 3.) 
In obtaining result (2) above, we shall show (Lemma 6) that the language L,, 
cannot distinguish between the ordinal ww and ~“~2. Lzy,w can certainly define w“‘, 
and hence L,, < Lzr,,. 
We further prove (Lemma 3) that DL, is no more expressive than Lbar so it 
follows from (1) that DL, is strictly weaker than DL,,. We already remarked that 
regular and context free DL are special cases of DL,, and result (2) now follows. 
The fact that ww is indistinguishable from ~“~2 by formulas of DL, provides an 
explicit example of a limitation on the expressive power of even these powerful logics 
of programs. We remark that the above ordinals arise naturally in various contexts. 
For example, consider the set of all polynomials p, q with positive integral coef- 
ficients under the ordering: p < q iff p(x) < q(x) for all sufficiently large x. This is a 
well ordering of type ww. If we take two copies of this well ordering and put them end 
to end we get a well ordering of type w-.2. Orderings involving ordinal exponen- 
tiation also arise quite naturally with multisets, see [3]. 
1. BASIC DEFINITIONS 
DEFINITION 3. We define the notions: instruction, seq, program, and formula of 
DL,, by simultaneous recursion using (A)-(D) below. If (C’) is used instead of (C) 
then we get the corresponding notions for DLn. 
(A) Instructions: 
(a) If y is a variable and r is a term then 
y := T is an (ordinary) assignment. 
For example, x := f( g(y, z), z) is an assignment. 
(b) If g is an n-ary function symbol, x1, x2,..., x, are variables, and r is a term, 
then 
g(x 1 T.-Y xJ := z is an array assignment. 
Note that as a matter of convenience we disallow array assignments whose left- 
hand sides are terms of height more than one. There is no loss of generality, since 
DEFINABILITY IN DYNAMIC LOGIC 283 
array assignments to terms of height greater than one can always be replaced by a 
sequence of height one array assignments. 
(c) If y is any variable then 
y := ? is a random assignment. 
(d) If A is any formula then 
A? is a test. 
An instruction is either an assignment, an array assignment, a random assignment, 
or a test. 
(B) A seq is a finite sequence of instructions. 
(C) A program is an r.e. (recursively enumerable) set of seqs. 
Note. For DL, we shall modify (C) to 
(C’) A finite test program is an r.e. set of seqs such that only finitely many 
distinct tests occur in seqs in the set. (There may be infinitely many occurrences of 
the same test among the various seqs in the set.) 
(D) Formulas: 
(a) An n-ary relation symbol R followed by n terms is an atomic formula. 
(Equality is admitted as a binary relation.) 
(b) If A, B are formulas, x is a variable, and a is a program, then -4, (A V B), 
@)A, and (a)A are formulas. 
A full formal definition of the semantics of DL,, (which includes DL,) is given in 
16, 12, 141. To keep this paper self-contained, we briefly review the main definitions. 
A state s is a mapping from variables x,..., function symbols f,... and relation symbols 
R ,..., into elements x, ,..., functions f, ,..., and relations R, ,..., of matching arity on 
some set D, called the domain of the state. However, we insist that the relation 
symbol = is always interpreted as the equality relation. If s is a state and A is a 
formula of (any version of) DL, then s + A means that the formula A is true in the 
state s, or equivalently that s satisfies A. Truth of a formula in a state is defined as 
usual for atomic formulas and formulas whose principal connective is Boolean or a 
quantifier. 
To define truth for formulas whose principal connective is (a), note that what we 
have called seqs are actually straight-line program schemes, containing uninterpreted 
function and relation symbols. Given an interpretation of all symbols in the language, 
viz., given a state, it is possible to execute the successive instructions in the program. 
During execution, the values of some symbols may change. Thus, the execution of 
the assignment statement x := f(y) will in general change the value of the symbol x. 
An array assignment changes the value of a function symbol. For example, an array 
assignment f(x) := y executed in state s yields a new state t in which all symbols 
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except for f have the same value as in s, and f, agrees with f, at all arguments except 
for x, where it has the value y,. (Since function symbols as well as variables have 
changing values, there is little point in distinguishing them from variables, which is 
why we have merged the standard concept of a structure, which provides an inter- 
pretation for all function and relation symbols, with a valuation, which assigns values 
to all variables, into the single concept of state,) Execution of a test A? changes 
nothing if the current state satisfies A, or causes the computation to be undefined if A 
is not satisfied. That is, the test A? defines the input-output relation R,,? = 
{(s,s)Isk’}. Al so, Rx,_, = {(s, t) ( for every symbol and variable u other than X, 
us = at}. In general, any program a defines a binary relation R, on states: 
R, = {(s, s’) 1 there is a seq in a which, when executed in s, changes s into s’}. 
Then s + (a)A iff s’ k A for some (s, s’) E R,. In other words, (a)A can be read as 
asserting that “after executing a, it is possible to terminate in a state satisfying A.” 
For example, s + (x:=?)A iff s t= (3x)A. 
DEFINITION 4. We define the formulas of LEY,,,. 
(a) Every atomic formula is a formula of LzF,m. 
(b) If A is in Lz:,,, and x is a variable, then (3x)A and -4 are formulas of 
LCK W1.W. 
(C) If {Aili>O} is a recursive enumeration of formulas of Lz:,,, then Vi~i is 
a formula of Lz:,, . 
(Condition (c), “recursive enumeration,” presupposes that we have a uniform way 
of assigning Godel numbers to the infinitary formulas. The same presupposition is 
implicit in Definition 3(C). Such numbering techniques are well known [ 151, and we 
shall not repeat the details here. Given such an enumeration, a sequence of formulas 
is r.e. iff there is an r.e. sequence of Godel numbers for the formulas.) 
The semantics of Lz:,, is very much like that of first order logic. A state satisfies 
the r.e. disjunction Vi A, iff it satisfies at least one of the disjuncts. Finite disjunction 
need not be introduced separately as it is a special case of the r-e. disjunction. 
DEFINITION 5. We define Lba, bounded alternation Lzy,,, as follows. For each n, 
let L,, ~5; be the following sets of formulas: 
(a) L, = atomic formulas, 
(b) Lb = closure of L, under negation and finite disjunctions, 
and for n > 0, 
(c) L, = the closure of L;_, under existential quantification, 
(d) L; = closure of L, under negation and r.e. disjunctions. 
Then L,, = UnaoLn = U,,,C,. 
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We remark that the nonuniformity in the definition of Lh for n = 0 and n > 0 has 
been introduced for technical reasons concerning the proof of Lemma 3 below. 
DEFINITION 6. For any formula A, we define type (A) to be the set of all function 
and relation symbols occurring in A (including occurrences within programs in A) 
and also all variables occurring in A which are not within the scope of some quan- 
tifier. For programs a, type (a) is defined similarly. 
We assume throughout that all formulas and programs are offinite type. 
2. EXPRESSIVE POWER OF DL,, 
In this section we show that DL,, with or without array assignments and with or 
without random assignments, is equal in expressive power to LzF,w. 
LEMMA 1. , L::, < DL,,. 
Proof: We want to define a map q from Lz:,,, to DL,, such that for all formulas 
A of LE:,,, A holds in precisely the same states in which q(A) does. We define cp by 
induction on the complexity ofA. 
(1) If A is atomic, then &A) = A, 
(2) rp(-A) = MA ), and rp((3x)A) = (3x) rp(A ), 
if A = Vi Ai, let a be the program whose seqs are of length one and consist precisely 
of the tests cp(Ai)?. Then p(A) = (a)true. 
It is obvious that A and p(A) are equivalent. 1 
Note that the proof of Lemma 1 did not depend on the use of array assignments or 
random assignments, but did of course make significant use of rich tests. 
LEMMA 2. DL, 6 L$,,,. 
Proof. The proof of this lemma is simpler than that of Lemma 3, where some 
attention to the sublanguages L, is needed. Since we give the proof of Lemma 3 in 
detail below, we omit the proof of Lemma 2. 1 
Lemma 1 and 2 immediately yield 
THEOREM 1. Rich-test r.e. DL with or without array assignments and/or random 
assignments is equally expressive as LzTqW. 
The zeroary relation loopsn considered in [6, 121 means that the program a has an 
infinite computation path. For deterministic programs, loops, simply means that a 
does not halt, but for nondeterministic a it may be that a both loops and also has 
terminating computation paths. We remark that regular DL with random assignments 
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and loops, cannot be reduced to LL:,,. For if < is a linear order on some set, and if 
a is the program 
y := ?; while y < x do x := y; y := ? od 
then an infinite computation for a must yield a infinite descending sequence for the 
order (. Hence loopsu holds iff < is not a well order. Since well-ordering cannot be 
defined in L,,,, [9], regular DL with random assignments and the operator loops, is 
not less expressive than even r.e. DL with array and random assignments.’ In the 
absence of random assignments, loops, does not change the expressive power of 
regular DL or r.e. DL (with or without array assignments) [ 11, 121. 
3. EXPRESSIVE POWER OF FINITE TEST DL 
In this section we show that DL, is no richer than L,, and that L,, is strictly less 
expressive than Lz:,,, . Thus we get, 
DL, < L,, XL::,, = DL,,. 
This shows that DL,, is strictly less expressive than DL,,. Since both regular and 
context free DL are included in DL,, we get as a corollary that regular DL and 
context free DL are strictly poorer in expressive power than DL,,. 
LEMMA 3. DLf, < L,,. 
Proof: We show by induction on the definition of DL, that for every formula of 
DL, , there is an equivalent formula of L,, . 
The truth-functional and quantificational cases are trivial since L,, is also closed 
under these operations. Hence we only have to show that any formula of DL, of the 
form (a)A’ is equivalent to a formula of L,,. 
By induction hypothesis, there is a formula of L ba equivalent to A’; similarly all 
the tests of a are equivalent to formulas of L,,. Since a is finite-test, there is a k > 0 
such that A’ and all the tests in a are equivalent to formulas of L, (cf. Definition 5). 
The formula (a),4’ is equivalent to V, (ai)A’, where ai ranges over the seqs of a. 
We now show that each formula (a,)A’ is equivalent to a formula of Lk+ 1. This will 
complete the proof, since Vi (a,)A’ will then be equivalent to a formula of Lk+*. 
Each seq ai is equal to a finite sequence of assignments or tests equivalent to 
formulas of L,. Therefore, it suffkes to show that (z)B is equivalent to a formula of 
L ktl whenever I is an assignment instruction or test equivalent to a formula of L, 
and B is a formula of Lk+l. 
If I is an ordinary assignment of the form x := t, then (l)B is equivalent to the 
’ The predicate loops, was previously used in essentially this way by Park to show that his mu- 
calculus is not less expressive than L,,,, [ 131. 
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result of substituting the term r for free occurrences of x in B (renaming bound 
variables of B if necessary), and the resulting formula is in Lk+i since B is. 
If I is a random assignment x := ?, then (z)B is equivalent to (3x)E which is 
equivalent to a formula of Lk+ 1 since Lk+ 1 is closed under existential quantification. 
If I is a test C?, then (z)B is equivalent to B A C. Since B is in Lk+ 1, it is equal to 
a formula of the form (3x,) .-a (3x@, where D is a Boolean combination (possibly 
infinitary) of formulas of L,. Renaming the bound variables of B if necessary, we 
note that B A C is equivalent to (3x, . -. 3x,)(D A C) which is in Lk+ 1 providing C is 
in L,. 
Finally, we consider the most complicated case, that of array assignments. We 
start by noting a property of the language L, of Definition 5, which consists precisely 
of the formulas of first order predicate calculus in existential prenex form. 
Call a formula of LwIl, simple if the only terms occurring in it as arguments of 
relation symbols (other than equality) are variables, and all equations are between a 
variable and a term of height at most one. 
We claim that every formula of the language L, is equivalent to a simple formula 
of L, . To see this, observe for example that the atomic formula Rdf( g(x), h(y)) is 
equivalent to each of the alternative formulas 
(1) (3u, u, w)[R(v, w) A u = g(x) A u = f(u) A w = h(y)] 
as well as 
(2) (Vu, u, w)[(u = g(x) A v = f(u) A w = h(y)) =JR(~, w)]. 
Now a formula C of L, is equivalent to a formula of the form 
where D is a quantifier freeflnite formula in disjunctive form. Hence, by using the 
first of the alternatives above for unnegated atomic formulas in D and the second for 
negated atomic formulas, and then converting to existential prenex form, we can 
obtain a simple L 1 formula equivalent to C. 
More generally, consider any formula B’ of L,, where k > 1. B’ is composed of 
subformulas which are in L, and which are combined by repeated applications of 
Boolean operations and quantifiers. Replace each of these L, subformulas by an 
equivalent simple L, subformula. Then B’ is converted into an equivalent simple 
formula B of L,. 
So suppose I is an array assignment g(x) := r. We can assume by the above that 
the formula B is simple, and, renaming bound variables in B if necessary, we may 
also assume that none of the bound variables of B are in type(z). Then (I)B is 
equivalent to the formula obtained when every atomic formula of B of the form 
u = g(u) is replaced by the formula (U =x A u = 7) V (U # x A 2, = g(u)). The case 
when the arity of g is greater than one can be handled similarly. This finishes the last 
case and proves the lemma. 1 
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We now adapt the technique of Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse games [4] to L,, to show that 
no formula of L,, can express the assertion “< is a well-ordering relation of order 
type ww.” 
DEFINITION 7. Let D be the set of all ordinals less than ow and G be the set of 
all ordinals less than ~“-2. Let 6, ,..., 6, be in D and y ,,..., yn in G. We define for 
i E N the relation z, between n-tuples from D and n-tuples from G by induction on i: 
(1) (4 V...Y 4) =o (7, ,..a, 7”) 
iff for all j, k < n, it is the case that Sj ( 6, iff yj < yk. 
(2) (d, v**P 6”) =:i+] (Yl3***9 7”) 
iff for all m > 0 and all S’, ,..., Sk in D there exist y; ,..., yh in G such that (6, ,..., 6,) 
sl, )..., 6:) Ei (y I,..., y,j 7 I$,..., 6) an vice-versa with D, G interchanged. d 
Intuitively, (6 1 ,..., 6,) q (7, ,..., y,) means that (6, ,..., 6,) and (yl ,..., yn) are like 
each other, and the greater the value of i, the greater the resemblance. 
LEMMA 4. Let Li be as in Definition 5. Let A@, ,..., x,) E Li and (6 ,,..., 6,) hi 
(I+ ,..., YJ. Then A (6, ,..., 6,) holds in (D, <) ifSA(y, ,..., Y,J holds in (G, <). 
ProoJ By induction on i. Clearly true if i = 0. The inductive step will progress 
from Li to L; to Li+l, where L; is as in Definition 5. 
Notice that the transition from Li to L; is purely truth functional. Thus if 
(6 1 v-9 6,) ad (Y 1,..., 7,) satisfy the same formulas of Li, then they satisfy the same 
formulas of L;. Hence to complete the induction step it is enough to show the result 
for Li+ 1 assuming it for Lf . 
assuming it for L;. 
So suppose (6, ,..., 6,) Ed+, (y ,,..., y,) and A E Li+l. Then A is of the form 
(3Y, *** 3y,)B(x i ,..., x,, y, ,..., y,,,), where B E L;. Suppose now that A@, ,..., 6,) 
holds. Then there exist 8; ,..., 8, E D such that B(6, ,..., 6,, 6; ,..., 6;) holds. Now by 
the definition of zi+ 1, there exist y; ,..., yk such that (6, ,..., a,,, 8; ,.,., &,J pi (yi ,..., y,, 
r; 9***, Y:, )* 
Hence, by induction hypothesis, B(y i ,..., yn, y; ,..., ya) holds, and hence 
PY, *** ~Y,J B(Y 13***, Yn 3 Y 1 +. . y,) holds. 
We can show by a symmetric argument that if A(y, ,..., yJ holds in G, then 
A(6 , ,..., 6,) holds in D. 1 
To proceed further we use certain basic facts about the ordinals less than ~“‘~2. 
Any ordinal less than ww can be written uniquely as a polynomial in w with higher 
powers first, and positive integral coefficients. An example of such an ordinal would 
be a = 0~~4 + w’s2 + w + 6. An ordinal greater than w” but less than ~“-2 would 
be expressible, again uniquely, as w” plus such a polynomial added to it on the right, 
e.g., ww + a. Ordinal addition is associative, but not commutative, and if m < n, then 
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mm +.w* = w”, i.e., a higher power of w absorbs a lower power added on the left. For 
example, with a as above and /3 = w3.4 + 9, a + /3 would be simply w3+8 + 9. Also, 
a + ww would be just w”, and the whole of a would be absorbed. Despite this, if y 
and 6 are any ordinals, with 6 < y, then y can be written uniquely in the form 6 t p, 
where /3 is a suitable ordinal. We shall write /? in this case as y - 6. Observe that if 
6<a<y, then y=at(y-a)=Jt(a-6)+(y-a), and hence y-J=(a-6)t 
(y-a). We also adopt the convention that if y is less than or equal to 6, then 
y-6=0. 
Given any ordinal a, and i > 0, we can write a uniquely in the form 
a= w'e/3 + w'-'.n,_, t --. + n,, 
where /3 is an ordinal and ni_l,..., ,, n are natural numbers. We shall refer to the 
ordinal ~‘$3 as the i-head (or just head) of a and wi-‘.n,_, t se. + n, as the i-tail (or 
tail) of a. We let head(i, a) mean the i-head of a, and similarly for tail. 
DEFINITION 8. For any ordinal a and i > 0, the i-normal form of a, written Ilalli, 
is the ordinal 
and 
wi + w’-hi_, + - *’ + n,, if head(i, a) # 0, 
W ‘-“ni_ 1 + “’ + n,, if head(i, a) = 0. 
When the head of a is zero, we say that a has no head. Note that IIa[li is always 
<a, and that II(IIa,ll)lli = IIall,. Note also that if a has no head, then llall, = a, and that 
if a and a’ both have heads, then llalli = IIa’lji iff the tails are equal. 
DEFINITION 9. Let 6, ,..., 6, E D and y, ,..., y,, E G. Then for i E N, (6, ,..., 6,) szl 
(Y , ,..., YJ iff 
(1) II~j-~~lIi=IIYj-Y~IIi for allj, k, 
and 
(2) if Sj, yi are the least elements of their respective n-tuples then 
l/S,\/, = 1) y,JJi. (Thej must be the same by (1) above.) 
Note that condition 9(l) in the case i = 0 merely means that the 6, and yi are in the 
same respective order. 
LEMMA 5. If (6, ,..., 6,) Zi (J’l ,..., 7,) then (6, ,..., 6,) pi (yl ,..., Yn). 
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Proof, We begin by noting certain relevant facts about i-normal forms. 
(i) Ifll~ll~=lIo’ll~ and IIPlli=IIP’Il~~ then lI~+Plli=Il~‘+P’Ili~ 
This is proved by considering two cases. 
If p has no head, then neither does p’, and p = p’. If the a’s also have no heads, 
then clearly a + /I = a’ + p’, and the conclusion follows. If the a’s do have heads, 
then (1 a + plli = wi + tail(a) + p = wi + tail(a’) + p’ = (1 a’ + p’ [Ii* 
If /3 has a head, then so does p’, and these heads will absorb the tails of a, a’, 
respectively, under addition. Hence )I a + /Illi = oi + tail(P) = wi + tail(P’) = 
lb’ + P’lli. 
(ii) If (Ja(Ji+,=(I~lli+,, and a=a,+... +a,, then there exist /3i,...,& such 
that /3=/I, t *a* +pp, and for allj< p, /1ojlli=II/3jlli~ 
Notice again that if a has no (it I)-head, then neither does /I and the two are 
equal, so there is nothing to prove. 
So suppose that a does have an (it I)-head, and consider the last q such that 
aq > CO’+ ‘. Now aq may overlap the (i t I)-head and tail of a. Split ag up into its 
own (it I)-head and tail, and renumber if necessary so that p becomes p t 1, 
head(i t 1, a) = a, t .-. + ag and tail(i + l,a) = aq+l + ... tap. By (i) above it 
would be sufficient to find the jIj corresponding to the new splitting of a. Note now 
that tail(i t 1, /3) must exactly equal tail(i t 1, a) = a,, , + a.. t aP. So define the pj 
as follows. For j < q, j?, = II aj [Ii, /I, = head(i t 1, p), and for j > q, pj = aj. It is easily 
checked that this works. 
Now we return to the proof of the lemma, which is by induction on i. 
(1) Definition 9(l) implies Definition 7( 1) in the case i = 0, since a < /I iff 
IIS-allo= 1. 
(2) Suppose true at i. To show at i t 1, let us simplify notation by looking at the 
case n = 2 and say that (6,) 6,) ~i+l (y,, yz , ) 6, < 6,, and yi < y2. Suppose that we 
are given additional elements (y; ,..., y!J in G. We shall find (6; ,..., 6:) in D such that 
(4, J,, 4 ,***, 4) q (Y, 7 ~2, Y; ,..., rk). Th en we will have, by induction hypothesis, that 
(4,&,6’ Iv**9 4) St (Y1 7 Y2 3 I$ 7***9 I$ 9 ) so that (6,) 6,) -(+ 1 (y,, yJ as required. 
Now the new y’ fall into three groups. Those less than yi, those greater than yz, 
and those between y, and y2. Suppose, for instance, that 7; < y; < y1 < y; < y& < y2 < 
Y: < ?4. 
We know that y2 - yi has the same i t l-normal form /3 as 6, - 6,, Moreover, 
Y2 - Y1 = (Y; -,YA + (Y& - Y9 + (Y2 - Y3 
SO find pi, /.&, pj such that IIPiIli=II& -YlIIi, IIP~II~=IIY~ -Y;IIi, and IIPjIIi= 
ll y2 - y:lli these exist by (ii) above and the fact that 
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And now let S; = 6, + pi, and 8; = 6, + &. The ordinals Sj for j = 1,2,5,6 are 
chosen similarly. In choosing &, we use the fact that since 8: < UP’, the part of ow 
after & must equal ww, and hence has, for every i, the same i-normal form (oi) as the 
part of dP.2 after ya. 
Thus we have shown that the Sj can be chosen as needed. Since a symmetric 
argument can take us from D to G, the lemma is proved. 1 
LEMMA 6. Any closed formula of L,, that holds in (oY”, <) holds in (oY.2, <) 
and vice versa. 
Proof: For all i, the zero-tuple of w” is Ei to the zero-tuple of ~“-2. This is 
because Definition 9 of zi holds vacuously. Now apply Lemmas 5 and 6. m 
CK THEOREM 2. L,, XL,,,,. 
Proof. It is not hard to exhibit a formula of Lz:,, which means “< is a well-order 
of type UP’.” (Indeed, any recursive ordinal can be defined up to isomorphism by a 
formula of LE:,, [ 11.) The theorem now follows immediately from Lemma 6. u 
We remark that all distinct ordinals <o” are distinguishable by first order 
predicates, i.e., they are not elementarily equivalent. In Lba, any ordinal <UP’ is 
actually uniquely definable (up to isomorphism) by a single formula. 
THEOREM 3. Both rich-test regular DL and rich-test context free DL are strictly 
weaker in expressive power than rich-test r.e. DL. 
Proof: Both are <DL,, which by Lemma 3 is <Lba, which by Theorems 1 and 2 
is <DL,,. 1 
4. EXPRESSIVENESS OF RANDOM AND ARRAY ASSIGNMENTS IN FINITE TEST DL 
We saw in Section 2 that the expressive power of DL,, does not depend on whether 
array assignments or random assignments are included. However,. this is not true for 
regular DL. Regular DL with both array assignments and random assignments is 
more expressive than if we only have one of these two facilities. It turns out that these 
results do not depend on properties of regular programs other than the fact that they 
are finite test programs. As we have remarked before, the finite test property is also 
possessed by context free programs (though not by r.e. programs). 
In the following, unless otherwise indicated, DL always means rich-test,finite test 
DL, and the presence or absence of array assignments or random assignments will be 
indicated by a subscript “+” or “-“, remembering that “array” precedes “random” 
in the alphabetical ordering. Thus, for example, DL, = DL, + , and DL, _ denotes 
finite test, rich-test DL with array assignments and without random assignments. 
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LEMMA 7. There is a formula A,, of regular, atomic test DL with array and 
random assignments such that foi every state s, s I= A,i, ifs the domain of s is finite. 
ProoJ Let f := ? denote the regular program (X := ?; y := ?; f(x) := y)*. This 
program nondeterministically resets f to a new function which can differ from f at 
any finite number of places. Let a be the program (U := ?; v := ?) and let /I be the 
program while u # v do u := f (u) od. Finally, let Afi, be the formula 
(f := ?)[aj(p)true. 
We claim that s ti A,, iff the domain of s is finite. To see this, let t be a possible 
state after termination off := ? starting in state s. Note that D, = D,, and t satisfies 
[a](/?)true iff it is possible to go from any u to any v by applying f, enough times. 
This means that repeated applications off, generate a finite cycle that covers D,, and 
so D, is finite. Conversely, if the domain of s is finite, then clearly f, can be reset by 
f := ? to a new function f, so that the resulting state t satisfies [a]@)true. 1 
We now proceed to show that unless both random and array assignments are used, 
finiteness is not expressible in finite test DL. 
We henceforth assume that relation symbols other than equality do not occur in 
states or formulas. This restriction to function symbols is made solely for 
convenience and involves no loss of generality. 
Let Z be a finite set of function symbols and variables. For any state s, a subset 
S, c D, is called the E-support of s provided 
(i) x, E S, for all variables x in Z, 
(ii) for all elements d, ,..., d, E D, and n-ary function symbols f E Z, if 
f,(d, ,..., 4) z 4, then f (d, ,..., d,J, d, ,..., d, E S,, 
(iii) S, is the set theoretically least set satisfying (i) and (ii). 
In other words, on arguments not in the support all functions equal the projection 
on the first argument. The Z-support of a state is uniquely determined by (i)-(iii). 
Let us say that two states s and t are Z-support-isomorphic iff there is a bijection (p 
between the Z-support S, of s and the Z-support S, of t such that 
G4-G) =x,7 and &Xd, T..+) d,)) = .A(@,),..., 9(4)), 
for all variables x E .Z, n-ary function symbols f E Z, and d, ,..., d,, E S,. 
Z-support-isomorphism detines an equivalence relation on the class of all states. If 
Z is taken to be the set of all symbols, then a state is uniquely determined (up to 
isomorphism) by its Z-support isomorphism class and the cardinality of the set of 
domain elements outside its Z-support. 
The Z-support-isomorphism class of a state is determined by the values of the 
symbols in Z on the Z-support of the state, so when the support is finite, the relations 
among these values can obviously be detined by a first order formula. Thus, for every 
state s with finite Z-support, there is a formula A,,, of predicate calculus which is 
satisfied by precisely the states Z-support-isomorphic to s. A,,, will be called a 
support-isomorphism formula. 
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Note that among the states t that are Z-support-isomorphic to a given state s, there 
will infinite states; in fact there will be states with all cardinalities larger than that of 
the support of s. 
For n > 0, let E, be a closed formula of predicate calculus which is satisfied by 
precisely the states whose domain has cardinality n. The formulas E, and their 
negations -X,, will be called cardinal@ formulas. A (finite) monotone Boolean 
combination of support-isomorphism and cardinality formulas will be called a 
support formula. 
For any class of states 9, define two formulas A and A’ to be Y-equivalent 
providing s t= A iff s I= A’ for all states s E 9. Let Y(Z, k) be the states which have 
a Z-support of cardinality at most k. Note that there are only finitely many Z- 
support-isomorphism classes in P’(C, k) (at most k(‘“‘)‘*‘, where m is the maximum 
arity of any symbol in Z and IZ[ is the cardinality of Z). 
LEMMA 8. IfA’ and A are Y(Z U {x}, k + 1)-equivalent, fhen 3xA’ and 3xA are 
Y(Z, k)-equivalent. 
Proof. Suppose s E Y(Z, k) and s satisfies 3.~4’. Then t satisfies A’ for some 
state t which agrees with s for all symbols and variables except possibly for x. Since 
the Z-support of s is of cardinality at most k, the EU {xj-support of r is at most 
k + 1. Hence t also satisfies A, and therefore s satisfies 3xA. 1 
LEMMA 9. For all k > 0 and all Z, every first order formula whose type is 
contained in C is sP(Z, k)-equivalent to a support formula. 
Proof. By induction on the definition of a formula A of predicate calculus, where 
type(A) c Z. 
If A is atomic, then whether s satisfies A is certainly determined by the Z-support 
isomorphism class of s, and so A is Y(Z, k)-equivalent to V {A,,, 1 s E Y’(Z, k) and 
s i= A}. This disjunction is equivalent to a finite disjunction of support-isomorphism 
formulas since there are only finitely many Z-isomorphism classes in Y(Z, k). 
If A is a negation 4, then by induction hypothesis applied to B, A is equivalent to 
a monotone Boolean combination of cardinality formulas and negations of support- 
isomorphism formulas. But -A,,, is Y(Z, k)-equivalent to V {A,,, 1 t E 9(X, k) and 
t is not Z-support-isomorphic to s}, which as in the previous case is equivalent to a 
finite disjunction of support-isomorphism formulas. 
If A is a disjunction, the result is immediate. 
If A is 3xB’, then by induction hypothesis B’ is Y(.?lU {x}, k + l)-equivalent to 
some support formula B, and by Lemma 8, A is Y(,?Z, k)-equivalent to 3xB. Taking B 
in disjunctive form and distributing the existential quantifier, we have that A is 
_sP(C, k)-equivalent to a (finite) disjunction of formulas of the form 3xC, where C is a 
conjunction of cardinality formulas and support-isomorphism formulas. Since 
cardinality formulas are closed, they may be removed from the scope of 3x, and we 
may assume that only support-isomorphism formulas remain in C. Now unless all the 
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formulas in C are equivalent to A,,, for some single s, 3xC is identically false. Hence 
it sufftces to show that 3xA,,, is equivalent to a support formula. This follows 
immediately from the following observation whose proof is left to the reader: if 
x, = r, for some term r of type Z- (x}, then 3xA,,, is equivalent to A,_,X1,,, 
otherwise 3xA,,, is equivalent to A, _ (+ A E,, where n is the cardinality of the Z- 
support of s. I 
LEMMA 10. For all k > 0, if a’ is a program of type CZ not containing random 
assignments, a is obtained from a’ by replacing some of the tests of a’ by Y(Z, k)- 
equivalent ones, and A’, A are Y(E, k)-equivalent formulas, then (a’)A’ and (a)A 
are Y(Z, k)-equivalent. 
Proof. Y(Z, k) is closed under execution of any single instruction I of type .Z 
other than random assignment, because tests and ordinary or array assignment 
cannot increase the support. That is, ifs E Y(Z, k) and (s, t) E R,, then t E 9(X, k). 
It follows that Y(,?Y, k) is closed under execution of any program a, and the lemma 
follows directly. 1 
LEMMA 11. For all k > 0, every DL, _ formula of type contained in C is 
Y(C, k)-equivalent to a support formula. 
Proof: By induction on the definition of formula A of DL, _. The proof of 
Lemma 8 applies to all cases except for A of the form (a’)B’. We may assume by 
induction hypothesis that B’ and each of the finitely many formulas B;,..., Bb 
occurring in tests in a’ are Y(Z, k)-equivalent to support formulas B, B, ,..., B,,. 
It follows from Lemma 10 that A is ,i”(Z, k)-equivalent to (a)B, where a is 
obtained from a’ by replacing the tests B;? ,..., BL?, by B,? ,..., B,?. 
Now (a)B is equivalent to V, (a,)B, where ai ranges over the seq’s in a. Also, (a!) 
distributes over conjunctions and disjunctions (here again we are using the fact that 
random assignments do not occur). Distributing (a,), we observe that each (aJB is 
equivalent to a monotone Boolean combination of formulas of the form (a,)E,,, 
(at) 7E,, and (at)Az,S, where E, and A,,, are subformulas ofB. 
But (B,?)A’ is equivalent to B, A A’ for any A’. Also, since instructions other than 
random assignments cannot enlarge supports, we conclude that for any state s, and 
for any assignment or array assignment instruction I of type E:, (z)A~,~ is equivalent 
to A,,, for some state t whose Z-support is no larger than that of s. Hence, by 
repeated distribution of (I) for successive instructions I in a,, we conclude that (ai)B 
is equivalent to a monotone Boolean combination of cardinality formulas occurring 
in B, B 1 ,..., B,, and support-isomorphism formulas A,,, where the E-support of t is: 
no larger than that of s for some A,,, occurring in B, B1,..., B,. But there are only 
finitely many equivalence classes of these cardinality and support-isomorphism 
formulas, and therefore only finitely many equivalence classes among their Boolean 
combinations. Hence the infinite disjunction Vi (a,)B is equivalent to a finite one. 
Therefore, (a)B is equivalent to a support formula. 1 
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THEOREM 4. No formula of DL + _ is equivalent to A,,,, , 
Proof Let s be a state whose Z-support has cardinality one. By Lemma 9, any 
formula A of type Z of DL, _ is ,i”(Z, 1 )-equivalent to some support formula B, and 
therefore A,,, A A is equivalent to the first order formula A,,, A B. 
Suppose A,, were equivalent to A. Then Afin A A,,, would be equivalent to a first 
order formula which was satisfied by states with arbitrarily large finite domains, and 
therefore, by well-known properties of first order formulas (compactness), also was 
satisfied by a state with infinite domain. Thus A,, would be satisfied by a state with 
infinite domain, a contradiction. I 
THEOREM 5. DL+_ is strictly weaker in expressive power than DL, + . 
We now show by a similar proof that finiteness also cannot be defined in DL_ + . 
Let Y’(Z) be the class of states which interpret all function symbols in Z as 
constant functions identically equal to the value of some constant c E Z. 
LEMMA 12. Every atomic formula is Y(Z)-equivalent to a formula of the form 
x = y or x = c, on c = c where x, y are variables occurring in the formula. 
Proof Immediate from the definition of Y(C). 1 
LEMMA 13. If a’ is a program not containing array assignments, a is obtained 
from a’ by replacing some of the tests of a’ by Y(Z)-equivalent ones, and A, A’ are 
Y(C)-equivalent formulas, then (a)A and (a’)A’ are Y(Z)-equivalent. 
Proof Y(Z) is closed under execution of any single instruction I other than 
array assignment, because tests, random and ordinary assignments do not affect the 
interpretation of function symbols. 1 
Define an inequality formula to be any Boolean combination of cardinality 
formulas and atomic formulas of the form x = c or x = y for distinct variables x, y. 
The degree of an inequality formula is the maximum of the number of free variables 
in the formula and the integers n such that the cardinality formula E, occurs as a 
subformula. We note that are only finitely many equivalence classes of inequality 
formulas of degree n and type contained in C. 
LEMMA 14. If B is an inequality formula of type contained in Z and degree n, 
and I is an ordinary or random assignment of type contained in Z, then (z)B is Y(Z)- 
equivalent to an inequality formula of degree Q max(n, IZ[). If B, is an inequality 
formula of type contained in C and degree m, then (B,?)B is equivalent to an 
inequality formula of degree max(m, n, 1 C I). 
Proof If I is of the form x := r for some term r of type cZ, then (x := T)B is 
equivalent to the formula B’ obtained from B by substituting r for every free 
occurrence of x. By Lemma 12, B’ is P(Z)-equivalent to the inequality formula B” 
obtained by replacing each occurrence of an atomic formula of B’ by an equivalent 
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atomic formula of the form y = z or y = c. The degree of B” obviously is bounded by 
the larger of II and ]Z]. 
(B, ?)B is equivalent to B, A B, so the lemma is immediate in this case. 
Finally, if I is of the form x := ?, we observe that (x := ?)B is equivalent to 3xB. 
Assuming B is in disjunctive form, we may distribute 3x over the disjuncts and the 
cardinality subformulas, and conclude that (z)B is equivalent to a Boolean 
combination of cardinality formulas and formulas of the form 3xC, where C is a 
conjunction of atomic formulas of the form y = c or y = z or their negations for 
distinct y, z. If x occurs in an uncomplemented atomic formula of the form x = y, 
then 3xC is obviously equivalent to C with all occurrences of x replaced by y; 
similarly if x occurs in an uncomplemented formula of the form y =x or x = c. If x 
does not occur in an uncomplemented atomic formula of C, then 3xC can easily be 
shown to be equivalent to a Boolean combination of complemented atomic formulas 
not containing x and cardinality subformulas E, where p < JC I. Therefore (x := ?)B 
is Y(Z)-equivalent to an inequality formula of degree max(n, ]Z]). 1 
LEMMA 15. Every DL _ + formula of type contained in 2 is Y(Z)-equivalent to 
an inequality formula. 
Proof: The proof is by induction on the definition of a formula A of DL_ + . 
The case when A is atomic is immediate by Lemma 12, and the case when the prin- 
cipal connective of A is Boolean is immediate by induction. 
If A is of the form (a’)B’, then by induction and Lemma 13, A is Y(Z)-equivalent 
to (a)B where B and all the tests in a are inequality formulas. Now (a)B is 
equivalent to V, (a,)B where a, are the seqs of a. By Lemma 14, each (ai)B is S@(C)- 
equivalent to an inequality formula of degree < max(n, I Z I), where n is the maximum 
of the degrees of B and the tests in a. Hence, A is Y(Z)-equivalent to an infinite 
disjunction of inequality formulas of degree at most n. But since there are only 
finitely many inequivalent such inequality formulas, the infinite disjunction is 
equivalent to a finite one, and so A is Y(Z)-equivalent to an inequality formula. 
Finally, if A is of the form 3xB’, then A is equivalent to (x := ?)B’, which is 
covered by the previous case. # 
THEOREM 6. There is no formula of DL _ + equivalent to A,, . 
Proof. The first order formula A, Af Vxl . . . xn[f(xl ,..., x,) = c], where n 2 0 
and f E Z is of arity n, is satisfied by precisely the states in Y(Z). The rest of the 
proof is the same as that of Theorem 4. ! 
THEOREM 7. DL_+ is strictly weaker in expressive power than DL + + . 
ProoJ: Immediate from Theorem 6. m 
It is shown in [ 121 that the transitive closure of the relation denoted by a binary 
relation symbol is not definable in DL, _ but is definable in regular atomic test 
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DLre = q’” 
v 
DL++ 
L- -4 
DL_+ x DL+_ 
-4 b 
DL__ 
FIG. 1. Expressiveness relations among versions of DL. 
DL-+. Thus regular atomic test DL_ + is not less expressive than DL, _ . It is open 
whether conversely, DL, _ is less expressive than DL_+ and whether DL__ is 
strictly less expressive than DL, _ ; the same questions are open for regular atomic 
test DL.* 
The results above are summarized in Fig. 1. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
We thank J. Tiuryn for several valuable discussions and Dexter Kozen who, spotted a serious lacuna 
in our original proof of Theorem 4. 
REFERENCES 
1. J. BARWISE, Back and forth through infinitary logic, in “Studies in Model Theory” (M. Morley, 
Ed.), Mathematical Association of America, Washington, D. C., 1973. 
2. W. DANKO, Definability in algorithmic logic, Fund. Inform. ZZ 3 (1979), 277-288. 
3. N. DERSHOWITZ AND Z. MANNA, Proving termination with multiset orderings, Comm. ACM 22 
(1979), 465-476. 
4. A. EHRENFEUCHT, An application of games to the completeness problem for formalized theories, 
Fund. Math. 49 (1961), 129-141. 
5. E. ENGELER, Algorithmic logic, in “Foundations of Computer Science” (J. W. deBakker, Ed.), 
Mathematical Centre Tracts 63, pp. 57-88, Mathematisch Centrum, Amsterdam, 1975. 
6. D. HAREL, “First Order Dynamic Logic,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science No. 68, Springer- 
Verlag, New York, 1979. 
*J. Tiuryn [personal communication, March, 19811 has announced a proof that regular atomic test 
DL_ _ < regular atomic test DL, _ . (An alleged proof of this last conjecture was announced in [2], but 
it has been observed by Meyer and Tiuryn that the proof is incorrect, and in particular, Meyer has a 
counter-example to Lemma 3 of [2].) 
298 MEYER AND PARIKH 
7. D. HAR~L, A. R. MEYER, AND V. R. PRATT, Computability and completeness in logics of programs: 
Preliminary report, in “Proceedings, 9th ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing,” May, 1977, 
pp. 261-268. Revised version, M.I.T. Lab. for Computer Science TM97, Feb. 1978. 
8. D. HAREL AND V. R. PRATT, Nondeterminism in logics of programs, in “Proceedings, 5th Annual 
Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages,” January, 1978, pp. 203-213. 
9. J. KEISLER, “Model Theory for Intinitary Logic,” North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971. 
10. J. MAKOWSKY, Measuring the expressive power of dynamic logics, in “Proceedings, 7th ICALP 
Colloquium,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science No. 85, pp. 409-421, Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin/New York, 1980. 
11. A. R. MEYER, Ten thousand and one logics of programming, EATCS Bull. (January, 1980), 1 l-29. 
12. A. R. MEYER AND K. WINKLMANN, On the expressive power of dynamic logic: Preliminary report, 
in “Proceedings, 1 lth Annual ACM Conf. on Theory of Computing,” Atlanta, Ga., May 1979, pp. 
167-175; M.I.T. LCS TM 157, February, 1980, in press. 
13. D. PARK, Finiteness is mu-ineffable, Theoret. Comput. Sci. 3, 2 (1976), 173-181. 
14. V. PRATT, Semantical considerations in Floyd-Hoare logic, in “Proceedings, 17th IEEE Symp. on 
FOCS,” pp. 109-121, 1976. 
15. H. ROGERS, “The Theory of Recursive Functions,” McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967. 
Primed in Belgium 
